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Introduction 
 
The Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) project at the NASA Dryden 
Flight Research Center, Edwards AFB, CA, has been investigating the 
use of neural network based adaptive control on a unique NF-15B test 
aircraft.  The IFCS neural network is a software processor that stores 
measured aircraft response information to dynamically alter flight control 
gains. In 2006, the neural network was engaged and allowed to learn in 
real time to dynamically alter the aircraft handling qualities characteristics 
in the presence of actual aerodynamic failure conditions injected into the 
aircraft through the flight control system.  The use of neural network and 
similar adaptive technologies in the design of highly fault and damage 
tolerant flight control systems shows promise in making future aircraft far 
more survivable than current technology allows. This paper will present 
the results of the IFCS flight test program conducted at the NASA 
Dryden Flight Research Center in 2006, with emphasis on challenges 
encountered and lessons learned. 
 
Project Background 
 
NASA’s IFCS program was conceived to develop and flight test 
control schemes that enhance control during a primary control surface 
failure.  The Second Generation (Gen-2) IFCS flight test project goal is to 
demonstrate a neural flight control system that can provide adaptive 
control without the requirement for extensive gain scheduling or explicit 
aircraft parameter identification.  The Gen-2 approach does not require 
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information on the nature or the extent of the failure or knowledge of the 
control surface positions in either nominal or off-nominal conditions.  
 
Participating Organizations 
 
The participating organizations for the IFCS project are: 
 
1. NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards AFB, CA, 
which was the responsible test organization. 
2. NASA Ames Research Center, Mountain View, CA, which 
was the organization responsible for the neural network 
design methodology. 
3. Institute for Scientific Research (ISR), Fairmont, WV, which 
was the organization responsible for the neural network 
implementation within the aircraft control laws. 
4. Boeing Aerospace Company, St. Louis, MO, which was 
responsible for programming the aircraft flight control 
computers and conducting Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulation 
(HILS) ground testing. 
 
Project Goals and Objectives 
 
The F-15 IFCS project goals were: 
 
1. Demonstrate revolutionary control that efficiently optimizes 
aircraft performance in normal and failure conditions.  
2. Advance neural network based flight control technology for 
new aerospace system designs. 
 
The project was tasked with applying advanced adaptive control 
techniques to significantly improve the robustness of the system. In 
particular, the goal was to use neural network based adaptive systems. 
The demonstrated system needed to be able to adjust to unexpected 
vehicle dynamic characteristics during normal conditions and also adjust 
for vehicle failures. 
 
There are some very striking examples of severely damaged vehicles 
that were safely landed. These cases have usually been the result of 
very skilled and very lucky pilots. Adaptive flight controls system 
technology has the potential to reduce the amount of skill and luck 
required and allow for safe recovery of a wider class of damaged 
vehicles. 
 
The general project goals were broken down into the following three 
specific objectives for the adaptive system: 
 
1. Reduce the initial transients due to the failure.  
2. Reestablish controlled flight (model following performance). 
3. Reduce cross-coupling effects. 
 
The extent to which these specific objectives can be achieved depends 
on the severity of the failure and the existence of reserve control power. 
The project demonstration did not attempt to show the limits achievable 
by the F-15 IFCS vehicle. Instead the demonstration shows the ability of 
an adaptive system to adjust with no advanced knowledge of the failure 
to achieve the above stated three objectives.  
 
Flight Test Approach 
 
The robustness capability of the neural adaptive flight control system 
was demonstrated in flight. Two types of failures were simulated: 
  
1. A simulated change in aircraft stability was achieved by 
changing the gain on the angle of attack feedback to the 
symmetric canard.  With fixed canards, the aircraft is both 
statically and dynamically unstable.  Angle-of-attack 
feedback to the canards is required for longitudinal stability. 
2. A change in control effectiveness was simulated by biasing 
and freezing one of the stabilator control surfaces. 
 
The failed system was evaluated both with and without neural network 
adaptation. The evaluation was carried out using 1g formation flight and 
3g air to air tracking tasks using standard Cooper-Harper rating 
techniques. A Congressional Milestone was created to “track completion 
of the flight demonstration of the second generation damage adaptive 
flight control system.” The project team was challenged to demonstrate 
that the adaptive system provides an improvement of one flying qualities 
level with a simulated failure. 
 
Test Aircraft Description 
 
The aircraft used for this research project is a highly modified pre-
production NF-15B airplane (USAF SN 71-0290), as depicted in Figure 
1.  The aircraft is configured with standard F-15 ailerons, stabilators, and 
rudders, but also has symmetrically and asymmetrically movable 
canards (F-18 horizontal tail surfaces) mounted on the engine inlets.  
The propulsion system consists of two Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-229 
engines, each equipped with an axi-symmetric thrust vectoring pitch/yaw 
balance beam nozzle (not utilized for this test project) and electronic 
throttles with no mechanical linkages to the engines.  A unique 
asymmetric thrust departure prevention system was designed for this 
aircraft which functions similar to F-15E aircraft, but reverts the normally 
operating engine to non-afterburner PRI (primary) mode above 1.1 
Mach.  Additionally, the aircraft has a unique quad hydraulic system 
configuration, quad redundant digital flight control system (FCS) with no 
mechanical backup to the flight control surfaces.  Each FCS channel has 
three processors, two for non-research specific functions, including the 
baseline flight control laws and redundancy management, and one 
dedicated for the research flight control laws.  An Airborne Research 
Test System (ARTS-II) computer provided a single string path for the 
neural network computations to interface with the research flight control 
laws.  The aircraft has an F-15E cockpit with pre-production F-15E 
display software and several unique displays.  The aircraft is equipped 
with a metal radome with a test instrumentation pitot-static system and 
angle-of-attack and sideslip angle vanes, and is extensively instrumented 
for propulsion, flight control, handling qualities, and limited structural 
testing. 
 
Pitch control is provided by symmetric movement of the stabilators.  
Symmetric canard motion is programmed as a function of angle-of-attack 
and does not provide any pitch control augmentation.  During roll 
maneuvers, asymmetric stabilators and ailerons provide roll control with 
symmetric rudders and asymmetric canards providing roll coordination.  
During yaw maneuvers, symmetric rudders and asymmetric canards 
provide control, with the canards providing significantly enhanced 
directional stability vice production aircraft.   During power approach, the 
ailerons droop similar to an F-18 for enhance slow speed operations.  
The aircraft is also equipped with conventional flaps and a preproduction 
speedbrake. 
 
Pilot-Vehicle Interface Logic 
 
The pilot uses the existing Multi Purpose Display (MPD) panel to control 
research functions.  The pilot-vehicle interface logic was developed 
jointly by a project pilot and a systems engineer.  The interface logic 
possibilities were constrained by requirements to use existing avionics 
software interfaces to the non-research flight control computers and the 
availability of quad-redundant cockpit switches.  There are three types of 
functions available, each having a baseline configuration when no option 
is selected (default) and 15 enumerated configuration options.    
 
With this much flexibility, the number of test configurations is quite large 
(approximately 450 for this project), potentially requiring a large matrix of 
ground tests to confirm the operation of each specific set of selections.  
For this test program, the tests were limited to a small subset of the 
possibilities, shown in the table below. 
 
PAL  DAG  Flying 
Qualities Failure Excitation Qbar Limit 
20 Baseline None None 733 psf 
21 Baseline 4 deg Left Stabilator Lock None 550 psf 
22 Baseline 2 deg Left Stabilator Lock None 733 psf 
23 Baseline 0 deg Left Stabilator Lock None 733 psf 
24 Baseline -2 deg Left Stabilator Lock None 733 psf 
25 Baseline -4 deg Left Stabilator Lock None 550 psf 
26 Baseline -0.5 Canard Failure Multiplier None  550 psf 
27 Baseline -0.2 Canard Failure Multiplier  None 733 psf 
28 Baseline 0 Canard Failure Multiplier  None 733 psf 
29 Baseline 0 1 Canard Failure Multiplier  None 733 psf 
30 Baseline 0.2 Canard Failure Multiplier None 733 psf 
31 Baseline 0.4 Canard Failure Multiplier None 733 psf 
32 Baseline 0.6 Canard Failure Multiplier None 733 psf 
33 Baseline 0.8 Canard Failure Multiplier None 733 psf 
34 Baseline None None 733 psf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 or 8 
35 Baseline None None 733 psf 
 
Table 1.  Failure Conditions Tested during IFCS 
 
Only two neural network options were tested, one which allowed real-
time gain adjustment by the neural networks (variable gain system), and 
one which disabled the real-time gain adjustments (fixed gain system). 
 
The typical engagement switch sequence required as many as 14 switch 
and button actuations to fully engage the system with the neural network 
active and a failure condition selected.  While this sequence of switch 
and button manipulations appears complex, sufficient simulation and 
training made it seem intuitive to the pilots.  Additionally, a challenge and 
response procedure was utilized.  Prior to any switch selection, the 
control room cleared the pilot or flight test engineer (FTE) to make the 
selection.  The pilot or FTE would then verbally confirm the selection, 
and the control room verified the correct selection based on 
instrumentation.  This challenge and response added the required level 
of safety to prevent inadvertent selection of the wrong IFCS options or 
modes.  Three possible pilot disengagement methods were available. 
 
Research System Design  
 
Description of the Gen-2 Controller 
 
The Gen-2 approach is based on the augmented model inversion 
architecture developed by Calise1, et al, and Rysdyk2, et al. The general 
control scheme consists of a dynamic inversion controller with explicit 
model following. An adaptive component is added to accommodate large 
errors that are outside the normal robustness range of the dynamic 
inversion controller. The main components of the Gen-2 controller are 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Dynamic Inversion 
 
The dynamic inversion portion of the flight control system provides a 
consistent controlled response for angular acceleration commands to the 
vehicle. A simplified aerodynamic model is incorporated into the control 
algorithm. For a given commanded acceleration, simplified equations of 
motion are used to calculate the required control surface commands. A 
proportional, integral, and derivative feedback compensator is wrapped 
around the dynamic inversion controller to make up for the simplifications 
used in the dynamic model and to reject disturbances. 
 
Explicit Model Following  
 
An explicit model following scheme is used to achieve desired handling 
qualities. Reference models are defined with desired frequency and 
damping characteristics. The control system forces the response of the 
vehicle to match the reference model. The pitch axis desired reference 
model is a second order system: 
 
2( )
2 22
q K s Lref lon sp
stk s slon sp sp sp
! "
# $ ! !
+
=
+ +
 
The short period natural frequency ( sp! ), damping ( sp! ), and apparent 
lift curve slope ( L! ) are selected to achieve Level 1 flying qualities. The 
command gain ( Klon ) is chosen to provide an appropriate stick force 
per unit normal load factor (g). 
The roll axis reference model is first order: 
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The command gain ( Klat ) is chosen to provide the appropriate amount 
of roll rate for the given flight conditions, and the roll mode time constant 
( r! ) is selected to adjust how fast the roll rate is achieved. Values for 
these quantities were selected to achieve Level 1 flying qualities. 
 
Simplified Directional Axis 
 
The initial research controller used dynamic inversion in all three control 
axes: roll, pitch and yaw. While testing the original dynamic inverse 
controller with an asymmetric failure, significant cross-axis coupling was 
noted. Even with the adaptive system engaged the coupling was not 
reduced. To achieve a pure roll response, a dynamic inversion controller 
anticipates how much to mix yaw with roll control. This feed-forward 
command mixing was contributing significantly to the undesirable 
coupling. Eventually a classical β-dot yaw axis control path was 
implemented. With the resulting hybrid system the adaptation was able 
to better control the asymmetric coupling. This modification was 
necessary to obtain Acceptable flying qualities in the presence of a 
simulated failure with the Gen-2 system. A future system that 
incorporates adaptation in the forward path mixer might not require 
modifying the full three axis dynamic inversion system. 
 
Adaptive Neural Network 
 
The goal of the neural network system is to accommodate large errors 
that are not anticipated in the nominal control law design. A well 
designed flight control system is robust to a fairly large range of 
uncertainty or changes in vehicle behavior. As the changes become 
more extreme the performance degrades. An adaptive system has the 
ability to readjust the controller to re-achieve desired performance or re-
gain robustness about the new point. In a failed flight condition 
(degraded aircraft dynamics) or configuration (reduced control surface 
effectiveness), larger than expected errors will develop.  The adaptive 
neural networks operate in conjunction with the measured response error 
of the control system. Weights (gains) on the neural network parameters 
are dynamically adjusted until the error is reduced. The weights act as 
adjustments to the proportional, integral, and derivative feedback gains. 
Weights can also provide a control bias, a new feedback to the system, 
or new cross-feed paths between the control axes. When optimal 
weights are achieved the feedback error is minimized and the system 
achieves better reference model following and presumably better 
handling qualities. 
  
The F-15 IFCS implementation incorporated three neural networks that 
provided adjustment to the roll, pitch, and yaw forward path commands 
(Uad  in figure 2). Dead-zones were applied for the inputs to the neural 
network. These dead zones were used to keep the neural networks from 
constantly adapting to small errors. The sizes of the dead zones were 
determined by using the 6-degree-of-freedom software simulation. Limits 
were also placed on the weight magnitudes. These weight limits helped 
provide a limited authority system for initial test purposes.   
 
Safety Monitors 
 
Limits on the neural network commands were required since the neural 
networks were implemented in the single-string ARTS-II computer and 
were considered experimental software.  The limiters were required to 
allow relatively large commands for adaptation in the presence of large 
failures, but also were needed to provide protection from a high rate 
hard-over failure of the adaptation software or hardware. A special safety 
monitor called a floating limiter was designed for the IFCS program. The 
features of the floating limiter are shown in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 shows a maximum upper and lower boundary in red. When 
these boundaries are violated an immediate disengagement is initiated. 
Within the red boundaries is a green floating range. When the neural 
network commands are within the green window, full dynamic rate is 
allowed. The green window is allowed to float to center itself about the 
input signal. This aspect allows for a large slow bias change associated 
with re-trimming an asymmetric vehicle.  
 
When the neural network command moves rapidly in one direction the 
signal will adjust to the moving window boundary. At that point the signal 
is rate limited and, if it persists on the boundary, will eventually cause a 
research system disengagement.  
 
This relatively complicated nonlinear limiter was effective in providing 
unlimited small dynamic motion and large re-trimming authority while still 
protecting from unsafe neural network commands. 
 
Software Simulation 
 
The software simulation was developed at the Integration and Test 
Facility (ITF) located at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center.  The 
IFCS F-15 simulation is a six-degree-of-freedom high-fidelity fixed-base 
simulation that has many components.  The core components include 
the aerodynamics, mass properties, equations of motion, structural loads 
models, and a representative crew station.  The simulation is used for 
software integration, hardware-in-the-loop integration, and flight test 
support.  It is also used in analysis for hazard and risk reduction. 
  
Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulation 
 
Hardware-in-the-loop simulation was conducted at Boeing in St. Louis, 
MO, for software qualification purposes.  The hardware-in-the-loop 
simulation integrated a software aerodynamic model of the aircraft with 
actual flight control computers, engine IDEEC controllers, and aircraft 
avionics components and displays.  An F-15E cockpit with a computer 
generated visual scene was used for piloted evaluations.  A capability to 
inject flight control failure conditions into the flight control computers was 
used to test the functionality of the failure detection algorithms and to 
provide pilot training and familiarization with degraded aircraft handling 
qualities.  Additionally, the pilot-vehicle interface (PVI) and engagement 
and disengagement transients were tested. 
 
During the hardware-in-the-loop simulation, pilots noted several PVI 
discrepancies from the design specification.  It was determined that the 
project could tolerate these discrepancies without expending limited 
resources to correct the software errors. 
 
Structural Loads 
 
The flight envelope and maneuvering requirements for the IFCS program 
were well within the capabilities of the NF-15B vehicle. However, the 
simulated failures and recovery from them generated unconventional 
control surface combinations. These unconventional control surface 
combinations could result in high local structural loads. Some method 
was required to ensure that the vehicle structural loads were maintained 
within limits.  
 
As shown in table 2, the aircraft with no stabilator failure has 
conventional control surface positions, with only minor differences 
between left and right surfaces due to normal trim requirements.  With 
the -4 degree stabilator failure inserted on the left stabilator (shown by 
the position change from +3.3 degrees to -0.7 degrees), however, the 
right stabilator carries the entire pitch trim requirement by deflecting an 
additional +3 degrees, and the roll trim requirement is picked up by the 
ailerons, as evidenced by a change of position of over 5.5 degrees by 
each aileron surface to counteract the roll produced by the asymmetric 
stabilator deflection.  Notice that the canard and rudder surface positions 
are hardly affected. 
 
Surface position No failure (deg) -4 deg left stab 
failure (deg) 
Left Stabilator 3.3 -0.7 (failed) 
Right Stabilator 3.4 6.4 
Left Canard -3.8 -3.9 
Right Canard -3.6 -3.8 
Left Aileron 0.1 5.9 
Right Aileron 0.5 -5.2 
Left Rudder 0.6 0.4 
Right Rudder -1.0 -1.2 
 
Table 2.  Affect of -4 Degree from Trim Stabilator Failure on Aircraft 
Surface Positions 
 
The NF-15B vehicle was instrumented for loads and a full loads 
calibration was performed in the Flight Loads Lab (FLL) at NASA Dryden 
Flight Research Center. Additionally, the program had an existing loads 
model that was developed by McDonnell Douglas for predicting aircraft 
structural loads based on measured loads from a previous NF-15B 
program. The loads model uses aircraft state and control input 
parameters along with the aircraft aerodynamics to predict a total of 45 
aircraft component loads at 20 load stations.  A set of flights were 
performed to check out the new loads instrumentation and to validate the 
loads model. 
 
Initially an attempt was made to implement the loads model onboard the 
vehicle in the primary flight control processor as a safety monitor. It was 
found that the memory requirements for that loads model were beyond 
the capabilities of the flight control processor. Instead the flight test was 
limited to maneuvers and flight conditions where the worst case load was 
predicted to be within 70% of the design limit load. The loads model was 
used as a loads preflight prediction tool and a real time control room 
monitor for the IFCS Gen-2 flights. A build up flight test approach was 
used to verify the predicted loads and maneuvering dynamics.  
 
In retrospect, the fidelity of the loads model and the inputs to that model 
would have precluded use as an onboard safety monitor. During 
envelope clearance the model limits were adjusted based on post-flight 
data processing and comparison with the loads instrumentation. If the 
model were incorporated onboard these adjustments would have 
required flight control software changes along with all of the associated 
retesting. 
 
Flight Testing 
  
Test Plan Overview 
 
The Gen-2 system was designed over a limited subsonic region.  
Originally, the design envelope included a supersonic regime, but design 
difficulties and limited resources caused the project to abandon the 
supersonic arena.  The final flight envelope was 15 ‍,000 to 35,000 feet 
altitude and 275 KCAS (knots calibrated airspeed) to 0.95 Mach.  The 
research controller was engaged and tested throughout this subsonic 
region. The clearance was achieved by maneuver build up using control 
raps to test for aero-servo-elastic stability, control doublets for basic rigid 
body controllability, control frequency sweeps to obtain closed-loop 
control system response characteristics, and wind-up-turns and loaded 
rolls to determine structural loads.  
 
Two test points were chosen to demonstrate the ability to adapt to 
vehicle failures: flight condition 1 at 20,000 ft and Mach number of 0.75 
(350 KCAS) and flight condition 2 at 25,000 ft and Mach number of 0.90 
(385 KCAS).  Neural network adaptation was not performed at flight 
condition 2 during this set of flight tests, but is planned for future testing.  
The maneuver build up was repeated with the simulated failures 
engaged.  
 
Once the maneuvering flight envelope was cleared, the handling 
qualities of the vehicle were evaluated with no failure, with a simulated 
failure, and with a failure and adaptation. A 1g wings level formation flight 
task and a 3g air-to-air tracking task were performed for each simulated 
failure.  
 
Flight Test Maneuvers 
 
Test points were cleared in a build-up fashion, so that the simulated 
aircraft failures began at the most benign failure magnitudes and 
increased in severity.  For the initial flight tests, the research controller 
was cleared by flying around the envelope and performing pitch, roll, and 
yaw raps and doublets.  After the controller was cleared, the neural 
networks were activated – first with no simulated aircraft failures, then 
with the symmetric type of simulation failure (gain change on canard 
schedule), followed by the asymmetric simulated failure (a locked 
stabilator). 
  
Flying qualities were evaluated by two pilots at the 20,000 feet, Mach 
0.75 test point using the Cooper-Harper Rating (CHR) scale and a Pilot 
Induced Oscillation (PIO) rating scale (Fig. 4) during various simulated 
aircraft failures.  The evaluations were conducted using the following 
sequence. 
1. Baseline aircraft evaluation 
2. Failure alone (no adaptation) on the research controller 
3. Failure with NN adaptation on the research controller 
4. Failure with NN adaptation on the research controller and NN 
training maneuvers 
By flying the above sequence the pilots were able to define flying quality 
degradations caused by the inserted failures and subsequent changes 
caused by the neural network gain adjustments.  Because the neural 
network required a finite amount of time to completely compute gain 
adjustments and because their level of output was dependent upon the 
aggressiveness of maneuvering, a training maneuver was added in an 
attempt to quickly optimize the neural network contributions.  This 
training maneuver consisted of longitudinal doublets aimed to maximize 
the neural network output prior to conducting the evaluations.   
During the evaluation two separate tasks were utilized while evaluating 
the flying qualities.  Deviations were made from the desired positions and 
corrections were made back to the desired position using increasing 
aggressiveness.  Using predetermined desired and adequate errors, 
handling qualities rating (HQR) scores were assessed for both gross 
acquisition and fine tracking tasks.  Additionally, the pilot answered a 
series of questions designed to help engineers determine the exact 
cause of any deficiencies noted. 
The first task was to fly a parade formation (two ship widths) position 
during straight and level flight.  This wider-than-normal position was 
required to accommodate potential transients in the event of unexpected 
system disengagements.  Deviations, both high and low, were made 
from the desired location and attempts to quickly reposition the aircraft 
were executed.  The desired tracking criteria was defined as a ring that 
spanned from the forward F-18 canopy rail to the ejection seat head box 
and adequate criteria was defined as a ring that spans entire F-18 
canopy and windshield.  Desired performance was obtained if the pilot 
could keep the wingtip missile launcher within the desired target for 75% 
of the time and adequate was defined as the ability to keep it within the 
adequate target 100% of the time.  Refer to figure 5 for desired and 
adequate target definitions. 
The second task was fixed gun sight tracking of a 3g F-18 target aircraft.  
The test aircraft was positioned 1,000-1,500 feet in trail while the test 
aircraft conducted a constant 3g level turn.  The pilot attempted to 
position the gun sight pipper on the target aircraft and hold it as close to 
the target as possible.  Deviations aft, left, right and forward of the target 
where initiated and repositions where conducted with increasing 
aggressiveness.  Desired and adequate performance was defined for 
both gross acquisition and fine tracking.  For gross acquisition, pipper 
errors of ±25 mils with a maximum of 1 overshoot were required to meet 
desired criteria and ±50 mils with a maximum of 2 overshoots for 
adequate criteria.  For fine tracking, pipper errors of ±5 mils for 75% of 
the time were required to meet desired criteria and ±10 mils for 100% of 
the time for adequate criteria.  Refer to Figure 6 for a picture of the gun 
sight. 
Two simulated failure types were utilized to degrade the flying qualities 
for the evaluations.  The first type involved canard feedback errors that 
affected the basic aircraft dynamics by reducing aircraft longitudinal 
stability.  The second type involved stabilator failures to alter 
aerodynamic control effectiveness, resulting in degraded pitch 
performance and creating cross coupling errors. 
Canard multiplier failures of 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.1, 0, -0.2 and -0.5 canard 
were flown.  The 1.0 canard multiplier was the baseline value and 
decreasing values resulted in decreased longitudinal stability. 
Although the flight control system provided the flexibility to fail either 
stabilator in any position, only the left stabilator was failed at 3 
predefined positions.  The left stabilator was failed (frozen) at the trim 
position, -2° from trim, and -4° from the trim position.  The trim position 
failure was predicted to be the most benign failure with increasing failure 
severity to the worst case failure of -4° from trim.  Larger failures were 
precluded due to excessive transients in the event of a transition to the 
baseline aircraft due to a detected fault, wake turbulence encounter, or 
for some other unanticipated reason. 
Prior to conducting the flying qualities evaluations each test point was 
cleared by evaluating the transients associated with failure engagements 
(conducted at 1g) and disengagements (at 1g and during dynamic 
maneuvers).  Additionally aircraft loads were monitored to ensure the 
non-standard control surface deflections and neural network outputs did 
not result in any unanticipated aircraft loads.  The following clearance 
flight maneuvers were used: 
1. Three axis raps and doublets 
2. Three axis frequency sweeps 
3. 3g and 4g wind-up turns (WUT) 
4. Half stick rolls in both directions 
5. 3g rolling reversals 
6. Pilot initiated disengagements during 3g WUTs, half stick 
rolls, and 3g rolling reversals (to evaluate disengagement 
transients) 
All engagement and disengagement transients were benign and aircraft 
loads were predominately below the 70% aircraft design load limit (DLL) 
with a few excursions up to 84% on the ailerons. 
Flight Test Results 
Formation Flight with Canard Multiplier Failure 
All of the handling qualities data was collected at 20, 000 feet and Mach 
0.75.  Handling qualities tasks (including formation flight and 3g tracking) 
were flown for the canard multipliers of 0.2 and -0.5.  The pilot ratings for 
the largest canard multiplier (-0.5) are presented in the tables 3 and 4. 
Canard Multiplier Gross  
Acq 
Fine  
Tracking 
PIO scale 
rating 
Baseline; formation flight 2 2 1 
-0.5 CM; 
NN off; formation flight 
2.5 3 4 
-0.5 CM; 
NN on; formation flight 
2 2 1 
Baseline;3g tracking 2 2 1 
-0.5 CM; 
NN off; 3g tracking 
4 3 2 
-0.5 CM; 
NN on; 3g tracking 
3 2 1 
 
Table 3.  Pilot A HQRs, Formation Flight & 3g Tracking Tasks, Flight 187 
 
Canard Multiplier Gross  
Acq (GA)* 
Fine  
Tracking (FT)* 
PIO scale 
rating* 
Baseline, formation flight 2.5 1.5 1 
-0.5 CM 
NN off, formation flight 
3 4 3 
GA 3 -0.5 CM 
NN on, formation flight 
4 2 
FT 1 
Baseline, 3g tracking 2/4.5 1/3 1/2 
2/3 -0.5 CM, 
NN off, 3g tracking 
3/5 2/3 
GA 1 
FT 2 
1/3 -0.5 CM, 
NN on, 3g tracking 
2.5/6 1.5/4 
GA 1 
FT 3 
*The first rating is longitudinal, the second rating is lateral 
 
Table 4.  Pilot B HQRs, Formation Flight & 3g Tracking Tasks, Flight 186 
Pilot A 
The canard multiplier (CM) failure resulted in a very slight degradation in 
both gross acquisition and fine tracking flying qualities and a significant 
degradation in PIO from the baseline control laws with the neural 
network adaptation off.   
The NN resulted in a slight improvement for both the flying qualities and 
PIO while the flying qualities and PIO ratings returned to the same 
ratings as the baseline aircraft.  Pilot A commented during the evaluation 
of the canard multiplier with neural network adaptation that the “…initial 
response was very predictable.  [It was] much like the baseline [airplane] 
without the failure.  [There were] no real undesirable motions, [and it 
was] very predictable.  [As far as] aggressiveness affects – [more 
aggressive] had little effect.  [As far as] compensation – normal 
compensation techniques where we’re having to stop the motion prior to 
being in position.  No coupling of axes and reasonable sensitivity, all the 
feel systems were good.” 
Pilot B  
The CM failure resulted in a very slight degradation in gross acquisition 
and a significant degradation in fine tracking and PIO.  Pilot B 
commented that although he was still getting the desired performance 
out of the aircraft, it was still possible to excite a mild PIO.  He remarked 
that he felt as though the entire airplane was rotating about the pilot and 
that he could see the canards moving in his peripheral vision.  Because 
of these two factors, his ratings were slightly degraded from the baseline 
aircraft for gross acquisition (CHR 2.5 to CHR 3) and more noticeably 
degraded in fine tracking (CHR 1.5 to CHR 4).   
The NN resulted in a slight degradation in gross acquisition, an 
improvement in fine tracking and no change in the PIO rating.   
3g Tracking Task with Canard Multiplier Failure 
Pilot A 
The CM failure resulted in degradation to Level 2 flying qualities for gross 
acquisition, a slight degradation in fine tracking and a slight increase in 
the PIO tendency from the baseline control laws with the NN off.  The 
aircraft had a tendency to “dig in” during pitch maneuvers with the failure.  
Additionally there was some undesired motion and left and right yaw 
associated with large longitudinal inputs.  This resulted in later pipper 
placement errors while conducting gross acquisition tasks. 
The NN resulted in a slight improvement in all tasks with the fine tracking 
and PIO rating returning to that of the baseline aircraft.  Pipper 
placement improved slightly with the NN but gross acquisition tasks still 
resulted in some lateral errors.  Even though the error magnitudes were 
reduced the pilot still had trouble predicting the lateral motion while 
conducting longitudinal inputs. 
Pilot B  
For the baseline configuration (no failure, no adaptation) for 3g tracking, 
pilot B noticed a slight degradation in the lateral axis while flying the task.  
Because of this, he separated his ratings into two separate ratings, 
separately rating the longitudinal and lateral axes.  Pilot B gave a CHR 2 
for gross acquisition, CHR 2 for fine tracking, and a PIO rating of 1 for 
the pitch axis; while giving a CHR 4.5 for gross acquisition, a CHR of 3 
for fine tracking, and a PIO rating of 2 for the lateral axis. 
For the -0.5 canard multiplier, pilot B noticed a slight degradation in both 
axes when the failure was introduced without the neural network 
adaptation.  
For the -0.5 canard multiplier with neural network adaptation, pilot B’s 
ratings indicated that he felt that the adaptation created a slight 
improvement in the longitudinal axis, but that there was a further 
degradation in the lateral axis.  He also noted that there was no PIO 
tendency in the pitch axis (PIO 1), but that there was some PIO tendency 
present for the lateral axis (PIO 3). 
Summary of Canard Multiplier Failure Tests 
Pilot B felt that during the formation flight task, the neural network 
adaptation improved the handling qualities in the fine tracking task, but 
slightly degraded the handling qualities in the gross acquisition task.  
Pilot B commented that during the failure with adaptation present, the 
airplane did not behave as precisely as it did in the baseline 
configuration (no failure, no adaptation).  For the 3g tracking task, while 
the neural network adaptation did not improve the aircraft behavior in the 
lateral axis, pilot B noted that there was a slight improvement in the 
longitudinal axis with adaptation, and that there were no PIO tendencies 
in the longitudinal axis. 
Comparing the ratings given by both pilots, Pilot A felt as though the 
neural network adaptation improved the handling qualities of the aircraft 
in both formation flight & 3g tracking.  Pilot B’s ratings indicate that he 
also saw an improvement in the longitudinal axis during 3g tracking with 
adaptation present.  Pilot B felt that the adaptation degraded the lateral 
axis, and also indicated that there were some undesirable motions 
present in the lateral axis while evaluating the PIO tendencies, while Pilot 
A stated that he felt that the neural network adaptation corrected the PIO 
tendencies present in the failure case with no adaptation. 
Formation Flight with Stabilator Failures 
Tables 5 and 6 are compilations of the pilot assessment of the stabilator 
failures during the formation flight task. 
Pilot A 
Pilot A rated the baseline handling qualities task for formation flight at 
CHR 2 for both gross acquisition and fine tracking, and a PIO rating of 1.  
His comments from flight 188 were that the “…initial response was good, 
it was predictable, no undesirable motions.  More aggressiveness didn’t 
cause any degradation in flying qualities.  Good performance.  No 
coupling of axes, good sensitivity, good feel system.” 
 Stabilator Failure 
Magnitude 
Gross 
Acquisition 
CHR 
Fine Tracking 
CHR 
PIO 
rating 
Baseline (flight 188) 2 2 1 
Trim; NN off 6 5 4 
Baseline (flight 189) 2 2 1 
Trim; NN off 3 3 3 
Trim; NN on 3 3 4 to 3 
-2 deg from trim; NN off 2 3 2 
-2 deg from trim; NN on 2 2 1 
-4 deg from trim; NN off 3 3 2 
-4 deg from trim; NN on 3 3 2 
Table 5.  Pilot A HQRs, Stabilator Failure in 1g Formation Flight 
Stabilator Failure 
Magnitude 
Gross 
Acquisition 
CHR 
Fine Tracking 
CHR* 
PIO 
rating* 
Baseline (flight 190) 3 2 2 
Trim; NN off 4 4 4 
Trim; NN on 4 4/7 2/4 
-2 deg from trim; NN off 4 3 2 
-2 deg from trim; NN on 3 4/7 2/5 
-4 deg from trim; NN off 4 3 2 
-4 deg from trim; NN on 4 4/4 2/2 
*The first rating is longitudinal, the second rating is lateral 
Table 6.  Pilot B HQRs, Stabilator Failures in 1g Formation Flight 
During one of the two trim failure test points, Pilot A assessed the failure 
to have the worst flying qualities with a degradation to Level 2.  Because 
of an in-flight control channel failure, the mission was terminated early 
and the failure was not evaluated with the neural network on.  
The second time the trim failure test condition was flown, the pilot 
assessed the flying qualities as Level 1, but there was still an increase in 
PIO tendencies.  The NN showed a marked improvement on the first test 
point, from Level 2 to Level 1 flying qualities, and no change from the 
second one. The NN did not improve the PIO tendencies during the trim 
failure.  The trim failure with NN on resulted in a slight degradation from 
the baseline aircraft and showed a slight overall increase in PIO 
tendencies. 
For the trim stabilator failure, initially the PIO rating was worse with 
adaptation on, but then improved. Pilot A did notice some change in PIO 
tendencies during formation flight.  He observed that the flying qualities 
improved significantly after the first 30 seconds of formation flight as a 
result of neural network adaptation. The pilot’s observations in flight are 
confirmed by looking at the values of the neural network weights as a 
function of time (fig.7).  The weights significantly changed after 30 
seconds of maneuvering.  The NN weight change was able to bring the 
PIO rating back to the same rating obtained with no neural network 
present.  For the -4 stabilator failure, Pilot A noticed no difference in PIO 
tendencies with or without the NN adaptation.  For the -2 deg from trim 
stabilator failure, the PIO rating from Pilot A went from a 2 to 1 
(improving slightly). 
Pilot B 
Pilot B experienced degraded handling qualities in the lateral axis while 
evaluating the primarily pitch axis dominated wing formation task.  
Because of this, the above table includes CHRs for both the longitudinal 
and lateral axis. 
Pilot B rated the baseline handling qualities card for formation flight as a 
CHR 3 for gross acquisition, CHR 2 for fine tracking, with a PIO rating of 
2.  Pilot B commented during flight that the “...initial response was good 
and abrupt.  We did get one or two overshoots on the first one, [which is] 
a little bit of a predictability issue.  As I did the maneuver a couple of 
times, [it] got more predictable, so I probably got used to the response.  
The airplane has got good handling qualities despite fairly aggressive 
flying.  We got desired performance the entire time, no coupling of axes, 
no feel system issues.”   
For the trim stabilator failure with no neural network adaptation, Pilot B’s 
gross acquisition and fine tracking task CHR degraded slightly to a 4 and 
the PIO rating was increased to 4.  The pilot stated that there was an 
underlying heaving motion associated with the failure.  Figure 8 
illustrates the pilot stick motions as a result of the cross coupling to 
achieve very precise pitch tracking without any apparent lateral motion 
during the formation task.  
Pilot B indicated that for the trim stabilator failure, the pitch PIO tendency 
improved with the NN adaptation on and that the longitudinal task 
remained the same for both gross acquisition and fine tracking however 
the lateral task degraded to Level 3 flying qualities for fine tracking with 
the neural network on due to a cross coupling effect that resulted in a 
lateral PIO with very aggressive longitudinal tracking.   
3g Tracking with Stabilator Failures 
 
Tables 7 and 8 show the pilot ratings for the 3g air-to-air tracking task for 
the trim stabilator failure. 
 
Stabilator Failure 
Magnitude 
Gross 
Acquisition 
CHR 
Fine Tracking 
CHR 
PIO 
rating 
Baseline (flight 191) 2 2 1 
Trim; NN off 5 4 2 
Trim; NN on  3  4 3 
Baseline (flight 193) 2 2 1 
-4 deg from trim; NN off 5 4 4 
-4 deg from trim; NN on 4 5 4 
-4 deg from trim; NN on 
with training 
3 3 4 
 
Table 7. Pilot A HQRs, Stabilator Failures in 3g Tracking Task 
 
Stabilator Failure 
Magnitude 
Gross 
Acquisition 
CHR* 
Fine Tracking 
CHR* 
PIO 
rating* 
Baseline (flight 192) 1/2 1/1 1 
Trim; NN off 4/6 4/5 2/2 
Trim; NN on 3/6 4-3-5/4.5 5/1 
-2 deg from trim; NN off 2/5 2.5/3 2/2 
-2 deg from trim; NN on 5/6 6/6 4/2 
*The first rating is longitudinal, the second rating is lateral 
 
Table 8.  Pilot B HQRs, Stabilator Failures in 3g Tracking Task 
Pilot A 
For the 3g tracking task, pilot A’s ratings indicate that the neural network 
improved the gross acquisition for all of the stabilator failures.  Each 
rating improved by one or more CHR points – CHR 5 to CHR 3 for the 
trim stabilator failure, CHR 4 to CHR 3 for the -2 deg from trim stabilator 
failure, and CHR 5 to CHR 4 for the -4 deg from trim stabilator failure.  
Training the neural network prior to flying the tracking task did not help in 
the gross acquisition for the -2 deg from trim stabilator failure (CHR 3 to 
CHR 5), but did help for the -4 deg from trim stabilator failure (CHR  4 to 
CHR 3). 
After flying the trim stabilator failure with the neural network adaptation 
on, pilot A commented that he felt as though cross-coupling was 
reduced, but that he was seeing PIO tendencies that he had not seen 
with the neural network adaptation off.  
Pilot B 
Pilot B rated the baseline handling qualities card for 3g tracking as a 
CHR 1 for gross acquisition and fine tracking in the pitch axis, a CHR 2 
for gross acquisition in the lateral axis, and as a CHR 1 for fine tracking 
in the lateral axis.  Pilot B indicated that there was no PIO tendency, and 
gave it a PIO rating of 1. 
Pilot B only rated the trim and -2 deg from trim stabilator failures for the 
3g tracking task.  For the trim stabilator failure, pilot B noted a slight 
improvement in the pitch axis (CHR 4 to CHR 3) for gross acquisition, 
but no change in the lateral axis with the neural networks on.  For fine 
tracking, the task with neural networks on seemed to be essentially the 
same as the trim stabilator failure with no adaptation present.  The pilot 
commented in flight that this was hard to evaluate, and indicated that his 
rating was changing throughout the task. This impression may have 
been the result of neural network learning during the task. The pitch PIO 
tendency increased with the neural network on (PIO 2 to PIO 5), but the 
lateral PIO tendency decreased slightly with the neural network on (PIO 
2 to PIO 1).  For the -2 deg from trim stabilator failure, pilot B’s rating 
with the neural networks on were degraded for both the gross acquisition 
and fine tracking tasks in both the pitch and lateral axis.  PIO tendencies 
in the pitch axis increased with the neural network on, while lateral PIO 
tendencies remained the same with adaptation. 
When pilot B flew the trim stabilator failure with no neural network 
adaptation, he noted the cross axis coupling present (especially in the 
lateral axis), but did not note any significant PIO tendency.  During the 3g 
tracking task for the trim stabilator failure with no neural network 
adaptation pilot B commented that “…when I put the initial piper on the 
target without doing any acquisition tasks, we were just kind of 
wandering around, it was pretty hard to keep on target, [it tended to] 
wander off to either side and in pitch fore and aft.  So the error was much 
larger and I would say it was marginal in pitch in terms of meeting 
desired criteria.” 
“Predictability was poor in terms of being able to keep it precisely on a 
point where you wanted it to.  Aggressive affects? – I think the more 
aggressive I got, the worse the errors got, so it requires you to back off of 
your gain.  Adequacy of performance was just barely – I’d say it was 
marginal between desired and adequate.  During the lateral axis, [I] 
definitely [got] a lot of coupling and pitch going on…during the lateral 
gross acquisition task.  In the pitch gross acquisition task, I tried to put a 
pure input in and I ended up off on his right wing tip.  So there’s definitely 
coupling, it’s more bothersome in the lateral directional axis than it is in 
the pitch axis.” 
When the neural network adaptation was present for the trim stabilator 
failure, pilot B compared the 3g tracking task to the trim stabilator failure 
without adaptation commenting that the “…initial response on this – the 
airplane was quite bobblely in pitch and laterally when I first started 
tracking.  That seemed to settle down a little bit with some time.  
However, when I got into the gross acquisition task, the pitch axis 
seemed to be a little bit better than the previous one, until I started doing 
the lateral acquisition tasks.  And one thing under lateral acquisition, 
every time I moved the stick – the piper would move up to the upper part 
of the 3-9 line and then as I got closer to [the] target, it would move 
below the 3-9 line.  It was almost like a half figure-eight trying to get it 
back on the target.  And the first time I did that [there] was a large 
overshoot, [but when I] started to compensate for it, the overshoot 
seemed to go down a little bit.  But I did get into a PIO on that last one 
after the gross acquisition.  So there is definitely a coupling of axis that’s 
going on and it’s most notable when you do the lateral task.  A little bit in 
the pitch task, [it] does have a tendency to pull the piper off to the right 
side of the target.” 
Pilot B also commented during his ratings that with lower (pilot) gains, he 
did not feel that the PIO tendency was present. 
Summary of Stabilator Failure Tests 
For formation flight, pilot A observed that the PIO tendency was worse 
for the trim stabilator failure with neural network adaptation on 
(compared to the -2 deg from trim stabilator failure).  Pilot B’s opinion 
was the opposite, observing that the PIO tendency was worse with the 
neural network adaptation on for the -2 degree from trim case, but 
improved for the trim stabilator failure case.  Pilot A’s comments 
indicated that he felt that the neural network adaptation was able to 
diminish the cross-coupling for the stabilator failures, while pilot B 
indicated that the cross coupling “was worse and far more noticeable 
than it was without the neural nets” for the trim stabilator failure. Both 
pilots agreed that for the -4 degree from trim stabilator failure that there 
was no difference in PIO tendency with or without neural network 
adaptation.    
For the 3g tracking task, pilot A noted an improvement for the gross 
acquisition task when neural network adaptation was present for all of 
the stab failures flown.  For the trim stab failure, pilot B also felt that 
gross acquisition task was slightly better in the pitch axis with neural 
network adaptation, but noted some degradation in the pitch axis for the 
gross acquisition task for the -2 stab failure with adaptation present.  
Pilot A indicated that the neural network adaptation was able to diminish 
the cross axis coupling present during the task, but felt that the PIO 
tendency was increased with adaptation.  Pilot B ratings also indicate 
that the PIO tendency in the pitch axis was increased for both failures he 
evaluated in flight where neural network adaptation was present. 
Frequency Response Analysis of Canard 
Multiplier Effect 
To achieve a change in vehicle dynamic characteristics, a change in the 
angle of attack feedback to the canard was made. This change in 
feedback gain acts to destabilize the vehicle. Figure 9 shows the closed 
loop frequency response of pitch rate due to longitudinal stick. The 
model following control laws attempt to match the frequency response 
depicted by the black dashed line. The grey shaded region surrounding 
the black dashed line represents the region of maximum unnoticeable 
added dynamics. When the frequency response lies within the grey 
shaded region, the response of the vehicle is indistinguishable from the 
response of the model to be followed (the black dashed line). 
With a canard multiplier of -0.5 and no neural networks the frequency 
response of the vehicle falls outside the grey shaded region. The blue 
line shows the predicted effect of the -0.5 canard multiplier. The green 
line shows the flight measured response with no neural networks. 
Comparing the green and blue lines shows that the effect of the canard 
multiplier was less severe than predicted by the simulation. 
The red line shows that with the neural networks on, the system was 
better able to achieve the model following goal. However, because the 
effect of the failure was less than predicted the benefits of the neural 
network were not as pronounced as desired. A future software load will 
provide the ability to put in larger canard multipliers. 
Handling Qualities Predictions Compared To 
Flight Data 
Both pilots performed pitch and roll frequency sweeps in the piloted 
simulation.  Pilot A performed pitch and roll frequency sweeps in flight for 
all three stabilator failures with no adaptation.  Automated frequency 
sweeps were also run in the batch simulation for comparison purposes to 
flight data.  All sweeps were analyzed using the lower-order equivalent 
systems (LOES) method.  For the pitch axis, a second order transfer 
function was used to determine short period frequency and damping.  
For the roll axis, a first order transfer function was used to determine the 
roll mode time constant.  The research controller was designed to meet 
Level 1 handling qualities for the no failure case. 
Several handling quality metrics - control anticipation parameter (CAP), 
Smith-Geddes, average Cooper-Harper (ACH) rating, and the Neal-
Smith method were used to predict the type of handling qualities that 
would be experienced with a simulated surface failure.  Table 9 shows 
the LOES analysis of the frequency data from flight and from the non-
linear simulation, along with these various handling qualities prediction 
methods for comparison purposes for the trim stabilator failure. 
Stabilator Failure 
HQ metrics 
Flight 194 Pilot A 
sim 
Pilot B 
sim 
Automated 
sim 
sp!  2.11 1.96 2.12 1.96 
sp
!  0.43 0.50 0.52 0.72 
r!  0.26 0.25 0.24 0.27 
CAP Level 2 3 2/3 3/2 
Neal-Smith Level - 3 2 - 
Smith-Geddes Level, 
PIO predicted? 
3  
yes 
3  
yes 
2/3  
yes 
3  
yes 
ACH 8.4 7.7 6.5 7.4 
Coherence (>) 0.60 0.85 0.94 0.98 
Table 9.  Frequency Sweep Analysis Parameters with Predicted 
Handling Qualities for Trim Stabilator Failure 
Simulation to Flight Data Comparison of HQ Parameters 
For the trim stabilator failure, short period frequency values obtained 
from flight and simulation data (using LOES) compared well.  The short 
period mode appears to be less damped in flight compared to the 
simulation data obtained from both pilots.  Roll mode time constant 
values are consistent between flight and simulation data.   
The CAP level predicted from the frequency sweep obtained in flight was 
Level 2.  This is reflected in Pilot A’s ratings during the 3g tracking task, 
as well as in Pilot B’s ratings for both the formation flight and 3g tracking 
tasks for the trim stabilator failure.  Pilot A initially gave Level 2 ratings 
for the trim stabilator failure during formation flight, but when he rated the 
same failure again in a later flight, his ratings were all Level 1.  The CAP 
value from pilot B’s frequency sweep in simulation was on the Level 2 
and Level 3 border.  Pilot B did have a fine tracking CHR that was Level 
3 for the lateral axis (CHR 7).  All of the CHRs from pilot B were Level 2, 
which correspond to the prediction given by the CAP. 
The Neal-Smith plot generated from data obtained from Pilot A in the 
piloted simulation is in an area of the graph that indicates, “sluggish 
response; strong PIO tendencies, have to overdrive it”. Pilot A’s 
comments in flight 191 directly correspond to this.  In the 3g tracking task 
for the trim stabilator failure with no neural network adaptation, Pilot A 
commented, “very sluggish response out of the airplane, big overshoot 
there, probably above 50 mils”. Pilot A gave PIO rating of 3 in formation 
flight, and a PIO rating of 2 in the 3g tracking task, indicating that he did 
not see a strong PIO tendency for the trim stabilator failure in flight 189.   
The PIO 4 rating given by Pilot A in flight 188 indicates there was a PIO 
tendency present, but that it was not divergent. 
The Smith-Geddes criteria predicts that a PIO tendency is present for the 
trim stabilator failure with no neural network adaptation.  The comments 
and PIO ratings from both pilots confirm this.  A plot of pitch stick input 
and pitch attitude for Pilot A during flight 188 shows the classic behavior 
of a PIO – pilot input is directly out of phase with the aircraft response 
(figure 10). 
Conclusions 
A very valuable set of data was collected for a direct adaptive neural 
network based flight control system. This data will be invaluable in 
learning how these kinds of systems behave in a real-world environment 
and allow further refinement of design tools and methodologies for future 
systems. 
The research flight control system provided good flying qualities as a 
baseline system. The integrators in all three axes provided reasonably 
good robustness to the aircraft in the presence of simulated failures.  
Because of this, the full contributions of the neural network 
compensation were difficult to determine. 
When the adaptive system was not required (no simulated failures 
present), the handling qualities of the vehicle were not adversely 
affected. 
The migration of the neural network gain weighting was generally as 
predicted. Real-world sensor noise and disturbances did not adversely 
affect the learning behavior of the neural network adaptive system. 
The complex floating limiter safety monitor worked well and did not 
cause nuisance trips with normal piloting technique.  With aggressive 
flying, there were a few instances where the floating limiter disengaged 
the system. 
The canard multiplier failures were less severe than predicted by the 
non-linear simulation. The adaptive system seemed to provide 
improvement with these failures however the change was less dramatic 
than was predicted. 
The stabilator failures provided a good example of an asymmetric 
vehicle. The neural networks provided some relief from the coupled 
behavior. However, with the neural networks engaged, the system 
tended to be much more PIO prone in the pitch axis.  Pilot control stick 
motions revealed that pilot compensation was adequate to deal with 
most of the cross coupling when accomplishing a pitch task.  However, 
for task accomplishment requiring motions in the lateral axis, pilot 
compensation was less successful. 
Lessons Learned 
Current aerospace standards for developing aircraft analytical and 
simulation models do not address cross coupling control surface effects 
between the longitudinal and the lateral-directional axes.  For robust 
damage tolerant systems that use unconventional control surface 
deflection combinations for control, this cross coupling modeling is 
required in order to properly allocate all available control power. 
The ability of the pilot to adapt to the coupled behavior of a simulated 
stabilator failure was greater than expected.  This might mean that 
eliminating cross coupling is less important than eliminating the PIO 
tendency for safe recovery of the aircraft.  However, cross coupling is 
difficult for pilot compensation if the aircraft is in a phase of flight where 
the mission can not be terminated gracefully, such as if the aircraft 
suffers damage in the middle of an air-to-air combat situation.  Mission 
continuation may be required for survival. 
The ability of the pilot to adapt to the simulated failures became a 
significant player in the handling qualities evaluations.  As the pilot flew 
the various sizes of failures to buildup to the larger simulated failures, it 
was possible for him to become accustomed to the effects induced by 
the simulated failures.  The use of guest pilots could solve this problem, 
where the guest pilot only evaluates the larger simulated failures without 
first becoming accustomed to the smaller failures.  This would enable the 
pilot to give a true first impression of the system.   
Initial simulation models had a very high-gain, high-bandwidth flight 
control system. This system was very robust to simulated failures. 
However the dynamic inversion controller provided most of the 
compensation with the neural network playing a minor role. This initial 
controller did not have adequate structural mode attenuation to avoid 
adverse aeroservoelastic (ASE) interactions. When the controller gain 
was reduced to achieve ASE margins it was much harder to achieve 
robustness to failures. Also the neural network contribution required was 
significantly increased. 
Initially the performance objectives emphasized transient reduction and 
achieving model following after the failure. Piloted simulation results 
showed that reducing cross coupling was a more important objective. 
Explicit cross axis feed-forward and feedback paths (for example, pitch 
to roll and vice versa) were required in the neural network to reduce the 
coupling. Relying on feedback disturbance rejection alone was not 
sufficient. 
It was found that the baseline dynamic inversion controller contributed 
significantly to the undesired cross coupled response in the presence of 
a surface failure. This was due to the feed-forward paths and 
assumptions made in the onboard aerodynamic model. A simpler 
conventional controller would not have these added forward path 
contributions for an aircraft with an asymmetric failure. 
Selecting the inputs to the neural networks is very important to the 
system design. Transient errors that are normal for abrupt command 
inputs (i.e. during a full stick roll) tend to drive the neural network weights 
to a high-gain system.  The high gain system can result in limit cycle 
oscillations. 
A significant amount of design tuning was required to achieve robust full 
envelope performance for the F-15 system. This contradicts the promise 
of robustness for the unforeseen failure. In many cases the design had to 
be fine-tuned in the piloted simulation as opposed to using more 
conventional linear models.   
For a truly robust adaptive system, an onboard loads model to provide 
structural load limit information would be ideal. However the currently 
available models are too complex and not reliable enough for an onboard 
redundant system. 
Some flight loads are self limiting. It was found that the aileron structure 
was stronger than the hinge moment capability of the actuator. When this 
actuator is pushed to the limit the result is that the control surface 
deflection is reduced and no structural damage occurs. Conversely, 
when the stabilators are pushed to their limit structural damage can 
potentially occur. 
References 
1. Calise, A.J., S. Lee, and M. Sharma, “Direct Adaptive 
Reconfigurable Control of a Tailless Fighter Aircraft,” AIAA-
98-4108, Aug. 1988. 
2. Rysdyk, Rolf T. and Anthony J. Calise, “Fault Tolerant Flight 
Control Via Adaptive Neural Network Augmentation,” AIAA-
98-4483, Aug. 1988. 
 
 
Figure 1. NASA IFCS NF-15B, NASA 837 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  IFCS Gen-2 Control Architecture 
 
  
 
Figure 3.  Floating Limiter Design 
 
 
Figure 4.  PIO Rating Scale 
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Figure 5.  Desired and Adequate Criteria for HQ Evaluations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Gun Sight Used in HQ Evaluations 
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Figure 7.  NN Weights Time History for Flight 189, Trim Stabilator 
Failure HQ Evaluation in Formation Flight 
 
Figure 8.  Pilot Stick Motions During 1g Formation with Left 
Stabilator Failed to the Trim Position  
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Figure 9.  Closed Loop Pitch Axis Technical Performance Metric 
Mach 0.75, 20K Feet, Canard Multiplier of -0.5 
 
Figure 10.  Pilot Input vs. Pitch Attitude of Aircraft for Trim 
Stabilator Failure HQ Evaluation in Formation Flight – Pilot A 
 
